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Recent Decisions
Estate Taxation-Marital Deduction And Claims Against
The Estate. Lindsey v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 136 (D.C.
Md. 1958). Decedent and wife held five parcels of real prop-
erty as tenants by the entireties. Decedent executed a
will under which the residue of his estate was left in trust
to pay the net income to his wife for life with remainders
over. One day after the will was executed, decedent and
his wife entered into a contract by the terms of which the
wife agreed that if she should survive her husband, she
would accept his will, waive her rights to a legal share of
dower or a legal share of decedent's estate and that im-
mediately after the probate of decedent's will would trans-
fer all the fee simple and leasehold property which she
would then own to the decendent's testamentary trustees.
Decedent, in turn, agreed to endorse certain insurance
policies to provide interest income to the wife for life. The
wife survived decedent and shortly after his death fulfilled
her agreement by transferring the parcels of real estate
to the testamentary trustees. The testamentary trustees
then sold the property and retained the proceeds as part of
the trust corpus.
The plaintiff's, executors of decedent's estate, filed a re-
fund claim under which they sought: (1) to have the value
of the five parcels allowed as a marital deduction and (2)
to have the gross estate reduced by the amount of the value
of the five parcels as a claim against the estate. The Dis-
trict Court held (1) "that the value of the five parcels
should be included in the gross estate and should not be
deducted as a marital deduction or as a claim against the
estate, but (2) that for income tax purposes the parcels
acquired a new basis, the value at which they were included
in the federal estate tax return, so that no gain was realized
when they were sold by the trustees, and no income tax
was payable by them" [138].
The Court disallowed the marital deduction on the
ground that the substance of the transaction between the
decedent and his wife was that the wife received no more
than an equitable life estate in the parcels without a power
of appointment. The wife's interest in the parcels thus
was a "terminable" one and did not qualify as a marital
deduction. I.R.C. 1939 §812 (e) (1) (B), I.R.C. 1954,
§2056 (b) (1).
RECENT DECISIONS
The Court also disallowed a deduction for a claim against
the estate, holding that the wife's claim was a claim to a
distributive interest in the estate and not a claim against
the estate within the purview of the tax laws" [139] I.R.C.
1939, §812 (b) (3), (4), I.R.C. 1954, §2053, Latty v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 62 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1933).
Markwell's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 112 F.
2d 253 (7th Cir. 1940).
See also Awtry's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 221 F. 2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955) distinguished in the
present case.
Insurance - Excessive Coverage. Kelley v. American
Insurance Company, 316 S.W. 2d 452 (Tex. 1958). Plaintiff
took out a standard fire insurance policy with A Company
which contained the following clauses: (1) "No other fire
insurance is permitted on items insured hereunder unless
permission is endorsed hereon;" (2) ". . . this Company
shall not be liable for any loss occurring: * * * while any
stipulation or condition of this policy is being violated."
One month later plaintiff entered into a second fire insur-
ance policy with B Company, covering the same property
and containing the same prohibition against other insur-
ance. The Texas Appellate Court, in permitting plaintiff
to recover upon his original policy, held insured's second
policy was void ab initio and thus could not constitute
"other insurance" within the meaning of the prohibition
against "other insurance" in the first policy.
Maryland for some time has followed the view expressed
by the Texas Court on "other insurance" provisions in fire
insurance policies. The Texas Court, in fact, based its hold-
ing in part upon the leading Maryland case of Sweeting v.
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 83 Md. 63, 34 A. 826 (1896). Here
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the second policy
was void ab initio because of non-disclosure of the existence
of the first policy and thus did not constitute "other in-
surance" within the prohibition of the first policy.
It is important however to distinguish these cases from
those where the original policy contains a term stating
the policy is to become void if "any other contract of in-
surance, whether valid or not" is procured. For instance,
in Fire Ins. Co. v. Menke, 166 Md. 513, 171 A. 719 (1934),
where the original policy contained a term stating it be-
came void if "any other contract of insurance, whether valid
or not" was entered into, it was held as a matter of law
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that the insured, who had entered into a second policy con-
taining the same terms as the original policy, was not en-
titled to recover under the first policy or second policy.
Thus recovery under a policy where additional insurance
has been procured, against the express terms of said policy
seems to rest primarily upon the wording used in the pro-
hibition of the first policy.
Insurance - Insurer's Liability For Failure To Appeal.
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 260 F. 2d
361 (10th Cir. 1958). Defendant insurance company issued
a liability policy to insured for $10,000 maximum coverage.
Plaintiff indemnity company agreed to indemnify insured
against any losses in excess of $10,000. Shortly thereafter
insured was sued for negligence, and defendant undertook
its defense under the terms of the policy. The trial resulted
in a judgment against the insured of over $22,000. De-
fendant, against the advice of its own counsel, refused to
take an appeal, whereupon the plaintiff took the appeal
in the name of the insured. The judgment of the trial court
was affirmed. Plaintiff paid the judgment in excess of
$10,000 and instituted the present action to recover costs
of the appeal including a reasonable attorney's fee. Plain-
tiff's theory of recovery was that defendant was bound to
take an appeal by the terms of its policy, and its failure
to do so constituted a breach of contract which subjected
it to liability for the cost of appeal to its insured. Plaintiff
claimed that by taking the appeal in insured's name it
became subrogated to certain rights of insured against
defendant. Defendant's policy contained a provision re-
quiring defendant to "defend any suit against the insured,
... even if such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent."
The appellate court held that the defendant under the
facts in the present case was not liable for its refusal to
appeal. The court concluded that any liability for defen-
dant's refusal to appeal must be based on defendant's bad
faith and that mere disregard of its counsel's advice to
appeal did not constitute a showing of bad faith.
Pleading - Effect Of Plea Of Limitations On Amended
Declaration. Doughty v. Prettyman, ...... Md ....... 148 A. 2d
438 (1959). Infant plaintiff filed a declaration claiming dam-
ages for personal injuries sustained in Virginia while riding
in a motor truck owned by defendant's decedent and oper-
ated by decedent's agent Johnson. The original declaration
contained two counts. The first alleged that the accident
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was caused by Johnson's negligent operation of the truck
and the second that the accident was caused by a defective
condition of the truck about which decedent knew or
should have known. Over a period of five years a series of
amendments were made. A Virginia statute provided that
a guest could only recover for injuries sustained through
the gross negligence of the driver. Such gross negligence
was alleged within the statutory period but the allegation
that the status of the plaintiff was that of a guest was not.
As to the second count, there was no allegation that dece-
dent was grossly negligent in permitting the alleged de-
fective condition of the truck to exist, until more than
three years after the accident occurred nor was there an
allegation that the plaintiff was a casual employee, until
more than three years after the accident.
Defendant contended that adding these three allegations
more than three years after the accident occurred, modi-
fied the causes of action set forth in the original declara-
tion so that a new cause of action was actually alleged. The
Court of Appeals held that no new cause of action had been
stated by the amendments. The Court applied what seems
to be a test of what constitutes a new cause of action by
amendment, suggested previously by the Court in Cline v.
Fountain, Etc., Company, 214 Md. 251, 134 A. 2d 304 (1957),
noted, 18 Md. L. Rev. 161 (1958), i.e., whether or not it
can be said that the evidence which would support one
cause would support another or whether a judgment on one
cause of action would preclude suit on the other. In the
present suit the Court reasoned "Evidence of the negligence
of Johnson, the driver of the truck, would have supported
the first count in its original or its amended form, and
evidence that the truck was defective and that the appel-
lee's decedent knew or should have known of the defect
would have supported the second count in all its variations"
[4421. While it can hardly be said such a test will always
be conclusive, it does offer some help in solving the riddle
of when an amended declaration alleges a new cause of
action.
Price Discrimination - Promotional And Advertising
Allowances Under Robinson-Patman Act. Atalanta Trad-
ing Corp. v. Federal Trade Com'n., 258 F. 2d 365 (3rd Cir.,
1958). In three small, isolated sales of meat products, de-
fendant meat distributor gave spot promotional and adver-
tising allowances which it did not extend to other custo-
mers. The Federal Trade Commission held this a violation
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of § 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. (1951)
§ 13 (d), which forbids suppliers to grant allowances to any
customers without making these allowances available on
proportionately equal terms "to all other customers com-
peting in the distribution of such products or commodities."
The Commission asserted in its finding that the defendant
by granting allowances in three instances on canned hams,
pork shoulders, and pre-cooked Canadian bacon, had obli-
gated itself to offer similar allowances on "its entire line
of products - here meat products." [368].
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in revers-
ing, found that a supplier is only required to offer allow-
ances to other customers selling products of "like grade or
quality" as the goods on which it granted the disputed
allowance. The court also found that because the favored
sales occurred either months after or prior to any sale in
which an allowance was denied the necessary factor of
actual competition between favored and unfavored custo-
mers was missing. It seems fair to say that in the Third Cir-
cuit at least the court will require the F.T.C. to show that
there is in fact competition between favored and unfavored
customers and that similarity of products will be material
to such determination. Any lapse of time between the mak-
ing of the favored sale and the unfavored sale will also be
a factor in determining whether competition does exist.
Real Property - Lessor's Covenant To Pay Taxes.
Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146 A. 2d 458 (1958).
Plaintiff executed a fifteen year lease to defendant lessee
under which lessee held an option to purchase and under
which the lessor covenanted to pay the annual municipal
real estate taxes on the premises. Lessee shortly there-
after engaged in extensive building renovations whereby
the premises were changed from a laundry to an office
building. As a result of these improvements lessor was
forced to pay an additional $2700 in taxes. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held on appeal that the lessor could recover
the excess taxes he had paid as a result of lessee's improve-
ments despite the fact that the lessor had expressly cove-
nanted to pay the taxes. The court found that the changes
in question were not expressly authorized by the lease
and concluded that the lessee's alterations constituted
waste even though the actual value of the building was
enhanced.
Maryland has no case directly in point. However, two
early Maryland cases, Maddox v. White, 4 Md. 72, 79 (1853)
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and Baugher v. Crane, 27 Md. 36, 42 (1867) allowed the
lessor to enjoin the lessee, or one claiming under him, from
converting the premises into uses inconsistent with the
terms of the lease, "from making material alterations
[and] . . . from committing other kinds of waste." The
common law doctrine of waste, providing for forfeiture of
a lease notwithstanding the beneficial effect of a tenant
altering the premises was held inapplicable to the Balti-
more City ground rent system in Crowe v. Wilson, 65 Md.
479, 5 A. 427 (1886). As long as the tenant pays the ground
rent and does not impair the security of the reversioner by
the former's alteration, there is no reason to prevent the
tenant from improving or reconstructing the premises. The
whole problem of improving the lessor out of his rent can
be avoided by the insertion of a net rent clause which makes
allowances for increased taxes.
Taxation - Place Of Filing Lien. United States v.
Delaware Trust Company, 167 F. Supp. 465 (D.C. Del. 1958).
Notice of federal income tax liens were filed in the districts
where the taxpayer resided, i.e., in Maryland and in the
District of Columbia. After said filing, the taxpayer, a
beneficiary under a Delaware trust for valuable consid-
eration, assigned to defendants all his share of income
which would arise from the trust until payments to defen-
dants totaled $3400. The District Court held that the filing
of the liens at taxpayer's residences in Maryland and the
District of Columbia was not sufficient notice to bind as-
signees of the taxpayer's beneficiary interest in a real prop-
erty trust where the situs of the real property and the
domicile of the trustee was located in Delaware.
The Court rejected the government's contention that
the assignment of the beneficiary's interest in future in-
come arising from the trust was merely inchoate and thus
equivalent to an assignment of personal property located
at the residence of the assignor. The Court likened the
present case to Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937)
where it was held that the assignment by a beneficiary of
income arising from trust property was an assignment of
both the right to receive income and also of an interest in
the trust itself.
The Court expressly declined to say what the result
would be had the trust res consisted of part realty and part
personalty. However, the rule for real property trusts such
as this one is "that under these facts the plain intent of the
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statute requires the filing of the notice of lien at the domi-
cile of the trustee where the real property is located and
not at the taxpayer's residence" [469].
Torts - Damages Without Impact. Bosley v. Andrews,
142 A. 2d 263, 393 Pa. 161 (1958). Defendant's bull strayed
onto plaintiff's land and began to chase plaintiff. In the
midst of the chase plaintiff collapsed upon the ground and
suffered an attack of coronary insufficiency. Testimony by
doctors tended to show that while the bull's action did not
directly cause the coronary insufficiency, it was the event
that "triggered" the attack. The Pennsylvania Court held
that plaintiff could not recover for the injuries which re-
sulted from fright and shock of being chased by the bull,
since it concluded that the injuries were unaccompanied
by physical injury or physical impact.
In Maryland it is a settled principle that "a plaintiff can
sustain an action for damages for nervous shock or injury
caused, without physical impact, by fright arising directly
from defendant's negligent act or omission, and resulting
in some clearly apparent and substantial physical injury,
as manifested by an external condition or by symptoms
clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological,
or mental state." Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404,
165 A. 182 (1933). See also Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61,
69, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951), noted, 12 Md. L. Rev. 202 (1951)
on a different point.
In State v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 80 A. 2d
13 (1951) no damages were recoverable for shock, fright
or emotional strain where the injury resulted from seeing
one's property destroyed. A further distinction was made in
Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A. 2d 879 (1951) where
a mother was not permitted to recover for nervous and
mental injury caused by shock and fright from seeing her
two children struck and killed by an auto which jumped
the curb. No duty to the mother was found to have been
violated where the mother was not herself imperiled. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS SECoND (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1959) §313(2).
Torts - Wife's Right To Sue Husband And Child For
Personal Injury. Silverman v. Silverman, 145 A. 2d 826
(Conn. 1958). Plaintiff, mother-wife, sued her husband for
personal injuries sustained while she was a passenger in
a car driven by her son. Plaintiff was allowed recovery
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against the husband-father under the family car doctrine
for the tort of plaintiff's unemancipated son even though
it was against public policy in Connecticut for a parent to
maintain an action against an unemancipated minor child
for personal injuries caused by the latter.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has rejected the family
car doctrine, by which the owner of a car who provides it
for his family is liable for an authorized family driver's
tort while on family business, family business generally
having been extended by the jurisdictions adopting the
doctrine to any use for a family member's convenience or
pleasure. Instead, the Court has required that a family
driver be acting as the car owner's servant for the owner
to be liable for the driver's torts. Whitelock v. Dennis, 139
Md. 557, 116 A. 68 (1921); Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380,
116 A. 645 (1922); Baitary v. Smith, 140 Md. 437, 116 A.
651 (1922); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498,
72 A.L.R. 449 (1930); Rounds, Adm'r. v. Phillips, 166 Md.
151, 178 A. 532 (1934). For discussions of this area, see 2
Md. L. Rev. 288, 290 (1938), and MARYLAND ANNoTAnoNs,
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1936) 147-148.
In Maryland, the action in the principal case could not
have been maintained, since the Court of Appeals has con-
sistently ruled that the Married Women's Property Act
does not authorize a wife to sue her husband at law for a
personal injury or for injury to property, although a court
-of equity will grant an accounting for injury to a wife's
separate estate. Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247,
136 A. 534 (1927); David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755,
.81 A.L.R. 1100 (1932), noted 1 Md. L. Rev. 65 (1936);
Riegger v. Brewing Company, 178 Md. 518, 16 A. 2d 99,
131 A.L.R. 307 (1940).
The Court of Appeals has held, as in the principal case,
that a suit by a parent against an unemancipated minor
-child is against public policy, on the ground that the par-
ent's position as guardian of the child is incompatible with
the position of a suitor attempting recovery from the child.
Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, 72 A.L.R.
449 (1930), discussed 1 Md. L. Rev. 65, 67 (1936). How-
ever, a suit by a parent against an adult son has been al-
lowed on the ground that the parent and adult son "are
free and separate persons having the right to sue and be
sued." Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126, 128 A. 2d
617 (1957). In the Waltzinger case the court stated that
it was relevant that the son was not under the control of
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the parent, and that he felt no antipathy toward the parent
for bringing the suit.
See 18 Md. L. Rev. 326 (1958).
Unfair Competition - Misleading Labels. Royal Oil
Corporation v. F.T.C., 262 F. 2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959). The
Federal Trade Commission issued an order forbidding de-
fendant oil corporation from advertising, or selling used
motor oil, from which impurities have been removed, with-
out disclosing that the oil had been previously used. De-
fendant had complied with the provisions of a North Caro-
lina statute regulating the sale of reprocessed oil by label-
ling its product "reprocessed oil." The Commission asserted
its right to regulate defendant's labelling despite the fact
that Congress had not specifically indicated what dis-
closures are necessary when reclaimed oil is sold in inter-
state commerce. The Court of Appeals in affirming the
order found that the Commission possessed the power to
set up different label description standards than those re-
quired by state law. The Court concluded that the Com-
mission's insistence on a more specific description than "re-
processed oil" did not conflict with, but merely added to
the requirements imposed by the state statute. The Court
added, however, that where the Commission felt a more
precise labelling description was needed to avoid public
deception, the Commission was not bound by the state
statute but could go beyond it. It was held that the Com-
mission's authority to designate labels on oil came from
its general power to prevent use of unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce.
Maryland is one of twenty-one states which has enacted
legislation regulating the sale of reclaimed oil. 3 Md. Code
(1957) Art. 27, §231 (a) requires no specific words but pro-
vides that it will be unlawful to ". . . sell, expose for sale
or offer for sale in any manner so as to deceive or tend to
deceive the purchaser, any lubricating oil, lubricants, mix-
tures of lubricants, adulterated oils, or falsely labeled oils
which had once been used for lubrication purposes and
subsequently reclaimed, refined or reconditioned, without
clearly indicating or setting forth such fact on the con-
tainer, pump or distributing device used; .... "
It seems apparent that an oil label might well comply
with the broad standard set in §231a and still fall short of
the "used oil" label requirement set forth by the Federal
Trade Commission in the present case.
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